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Abstract: Section 6:152 of the Hungarian Civil Code (HCC) is an objective cap on the 
freedom of contract, it is an unconditional (absolute) and minimum protection to which all 
exculpatory clauses are subject. In this essay, this rule is examined in a wide and complex 
context. These exculpatory clauses are closely connected to the consent of an injured person 
or their  assumption of risk, or their waiver (especially waiving claims for damages) as 
unilateral juridical acts. The relationship between this statute and other grounds of invalidity 
shall also be examined, especially the connection to the invalidity rule of unfair standard 
contract terms. 
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Absztrakt: A magyar Ptk. 6:152. szakasza a felelősségkizáró és korlátozó kikötések 
érvénytelenségének általános, a szerződési szabadság határát kijelölő abszolút jellegű 
minimumszabálya. Jelen tanulmányban e szabály összetett vizsgálatára törekszünk. Szükséges 
ugyanis a károkozás jogellenességét kizáró károsulti beleegyezés, a kockázat tudatos 
vállalása illetve a joglemondás (itt elsősorban a szerződésszegésből fakadó igények 
érvényesítéséről való lemondás) mint jognyilatkozat elemzése is. Ugyanígy vizsgáljuk e 
tilalom más érvénytelenségi okokkal való viszonyát, elsősorban a tisztességtelen általános 
szerződési feltételek tényállását. 
Kulcsszavak: felelősségkizáró illetve korlátozó kikötések, károsulti beleegyezés, általános 
szerződési feltételek, tisztességtelen szerződési feltételek, fogyasztóvédelem, Polgári 
Törvénykönyv 
 
 
The general rule of nullity is formulated by Section 6:152 of the Hungarian Civil Code 
(HCC) against certain limitative or exonerative contract terms (hereinafter also referred to as 
exculpatory clauses) and it is to be applied to all types of contracts, for all types of breach of 
contract, and for all types of remedies. Furthermore, this statute is free from special 
conditions, and applying this rule, the validity of a given term is to be examined – 
theoretically – independently from other terms of the contract. This rule is an objective cap of 
the freedom of contract, it is an unconditional (absolute) and minimum protection to which all 
exculpatory clauses are subject: “Contract clauses limiting or excluding liability for breach of 
contract intentionally, as well as for the breach of contract harming human life, physical 
integrity and health shall be null and void.” 
This limit imposed by law is based on several rationales, as stated by Eörsi.1 According to 
one of these approaches, to the risk-allocating approach, every enterprise has to bear its own 
costs, including the damage caused. Since they are the best loss distributors among the market 
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participants either by distributing the loss among their customers with internalising these costs 
into market prices or distributing the loss among the group of market participants causing 
similar damage, i.e. by passing the risk to insurance companies and within risk-allocating 
groups of enterprises being similar potential tortfeasors. However, the risk-allocating function 
of legal rules relating to liability for damages and the risk allocating function of the contract 
could lead to different results. Therefore, the enterprises cannot exonerate themselves from 
certain kinds of damage, especially caused by intentional conduct. The other approach is 
focusing on the interest of injured persons, and it establishes a minimum and undiminishable 
protection of certain values like life, bodily and mental integrity etc. It should also be 
mentioned here that other general principles can also limit the freedom of contract. The 
prohibition of abusive exercise of rights is the rule to which the principle of freedom of 
contract is subjected, as well, especially when the abuse of rights materializes in the abuse of 
the negotiating power of the contracting party.2 
In this essay, the above-mentioned legal provision of HCC is examined in a wide and 
complex context. Since these exculpatory clauses are  closely connected to the consent of the 
injured person or their assumption of risk, or their waiver (especially waiving claims for 
damages) as unilateral juridical acts. The relation between this statute and other grounds of 
invalidity should also be examined, especially the connection to the invalidity rule of unfair 
standard contract terms. 
This complex examination of this single provision is based on the consideration that the 
other provisions, i.e., the ones referring to contractual liability for damages and to remedies 
for breach of contract, which directly affect the application of this general invalidity rule of 
exculpatory clauses, have been changed significantly in the new Hungarian Civil Code. It 
should be added that this work does not aim to address all the issues concerning special types 
of contracts or special risks (e.g. travel contracts, construction contracts). It remains on an 
abstract level where the comparative analysis method is applied to reveal the principles and 
policies underlying this general limit of the freedom of contract. 
 
 
1. Freedom of contract and limitative clauses of liability for breach of contract in the 
old and the new HCC 
 
The principle of private autonomy is based on three pillars: the absolute recognition and 
protection of private ownership, the acceptance of contractual freedom, and the freedom of 
association and the establishment of a legal person.3 Under Section 6:59 of HCC the parties 
are free to determine the content of the contract. The parties may depart from the provisions 
relating to their rights and obligations with mutual consent, unless prohibited by the Civil 
Code. The freedom to establish the content of contract is limited by mandatory rules which 
prohibit or require certain conduct from the parties.4 One of these prohibitions is the provision 
of 6:152 of HCC serving as a basis for invalidity. 
Although the function of this rule did not change in the new Civil Code, its regulation 
method and its regulatory environment has changed significantly. In contrast with the 
regulation of the old HCC of 1959,5 the lawmakers had dropped the condition that the 
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disadvantage incurred thereby should be offset by the adequate reduction of the consideration 
or by some other advantage. The other modification is that the new rule does not mention the 
gross negligence, only the intentional breach of contract. It means that the party could 
theoretically limit or exclude its liability for negligent conduct resulting in non-performance. 
The question is whether the non-mandatory nature of contract law, that is, the freedom of 
contract has been extended as the cases of invalid limitative clauses has been reduced. Will 
the limitative clauses flourish merely because the condition of compensation has been 
dropped? Does it jeopardize the balance of contract? In our opinion, instead of this minimum 
and absolute rule, other principles, e.g. the principle of good faith and fair dealing, the 
prohibition of abuse of rights will be activated to protect the legal balance between parties’ 
interests and to prevent the harmful effects due to imbalance of bargaining power. The fewer 
cases there will be when this provision (Section 6:152) will be applied, the more important the 
other grounds of invalidity will be.6 
As it was mentioned above, the risk-allocating function manifests also in the provisions of 
HCC.7 Tibor Nochta stated that as the liability rules for breach of contract – especially the 
liability for damages – have been modified significantly and turned out to be basically more 
rigorous, so the non-mandatory nature of these rules, with the restriction of damage to the 
foreseeable ones may enhance the importance of the exonerative clauses concluded by the 
parties.8 In our opinion, the risks emerging from a contractual relationship mostly emerge 
from the breach of contract. 
The main factors which drive the contracting party to apply limitative clauses are the strict 
liability and the significant risk of damage. In contrast with the old HCC, the new HCC 
introduced the reduction of indemnification of consequential damage to the foreseeable ones.9 
This amendment will also have an effect upon the application and wording of limitative 
clauses in the practice. 
The exculpatory clause does not only grant for the party the possibility of exoneration (in 
part or in whole) from the liability. In default of this kind of clauses, the party must prove that 
the breach of contract was caused by a circumstance that was beyond their control and was 
unforeseeable at the time of concluding the contract, and they could not be expected to have 
avoided that circumstance or averted the damage.10 An “exculpatory clause” has an intrinsic 
function to remove this burden of proof e.g. in case of damage caused by force majeure (vis 
major).11 
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2. Rules of invalidity concerning limitative or exonerative clauses in HCC 
 
In the following, two statutes of HCC will be compared, Section 6:152 and Section 6:526. 
Under Section 6:152 (Limitation and exclusion of the legal consequences of breach of 
contract) contract clauses limiting or excluding liability for damage caused by breach of 
contract intentionally, as well as for the breach of contract harming human life, physical 
integrity and health shall be null and void. 
Pursuant to Section 6:526 (Limitation and exclusion of liability for causing damage) 
contract clauses limiting or excluding liability for intentionally causing damage, as well as for 
harming human life, physical integrity and health shall be null and void. 
Between the two section titles there is a significant difference. The first provision 
concerns all legal consequences (i.e. remedies) of a breach of contract, the latter only 
concerns causing damage. 
Since the claim for specific performance (performance in kind) can be inverted to claim 
for damages in part or in whole, a limitative clause often materializes as an exemption not 
from all legal consequences, but mainly from the liability for damages.12 From this viewpoint, 
Sections 6:152 and 6:526 are “twin rules” in both regime of contractual and non-contractual 
liability law. It should be also added that this invalidity rule of the exculpatory clauses is 
applicable for the grievance award (compensation of pain and suffering, i.e. “sérelemdíj”), as 
well.13 
Albeit, the wording of these two provisions is very similar, and their functioning seems to 
us to be the same, the regulation methods of the two liability regimes differ from each other 
significantly. As it was mentioned above, the contract rules in HCC are mainly non-
mandatory rules in order to protect the freedom of contract. On the contrary, the rules of non-
contractual liability are mainly mandatory rules, even if the aggrieved parties could modify 
the obligations of the tortfeasor or could enter a settlement. It is possible for them to rearrange 
the indemnification of damage in advance, e.g. by concluding liquidated damages. The 
validity of this agreement is determined by the provision 6:526. 
Beside the general rule, private autonomy is restricted more in the cases of strict liability 
(the liability for highly dangerous activity and the product liability). In the frame of liability 
for highly dangerous activity, under Section 6:535 Subsection 3 the exclusion or limitation of 
liability shall be null and void; however, this prohibition shall not apply to damage caused to 
things. In our opinion, the starting point of this provision is not the admissibility of 
exonerative or limitative contract clauses, but the risk-allocation as public policy which 
imposes an obligation of indemnification of damage against the operator of an ultrahazardous 
activity. For the clauses limiting or excluding liability for damage caused to a thing, the 
general rule of 6:526 is to be applied, according to the principle lex specialis derogat legi 
generali.14 
Here, it should be mentioned that a new provision of HCC, Section 6:145, the so-called 
rule of non-cumul separates the contractual and the non-contractual liability regime from each 
other.15 If there is a contractual relationship between the injured person and the tortfeasor, 
neither Section 6:525 nor Section 6:535 may be applied. Therefore, the above-mentioned 
public policy for risk allocating function of strict liability rule becomes irrelevant. 
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In the frame of product liability, limitation or exclusion of liability for damage is 
forbidden in any case,16 so the rule of non-cumul generates even greater problems. 
 
 
3. Formulation and identification of limitative or exonerative clauses 
 
In practice, the exculpatory clauses may appear in the form of a contract term, or 
unilateral juridical act, or standard contract term, or in internal rules of an undertaking,17 and 
they generally concern only the liability for damages caused by breach of contract and not for 
all remedies of non-performance. 
The HCC’s focus is on contractual juridical acts, e.g. terms which require the consent of 
the other contracting party. No one could create obligational duties – as a rule – to oblige 
others by their juridical acts. Despite this, exculpatory clauses may appear in unilateral acts in 
practice, so it ought to be considered that the relevant disposition of the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (DCFR) opens its scope: “A term of a contract or other juridical act which 
purports to exclude or restrict liability to pay damages for personal injury (including fatal 
injury) caused intentionally or by gross negligence is void.”18 
The wording of the new Romanian Civil Code shows us the right function of limitative 
unilateral juridical acts. A notice which excludes or limits contractual liability, whether made 
public or not, has no effect unless the person who invokes it proves that the injured person 
was aware of the notice at the time when the contract was made.19 In our opinion, the 
unilateral juridical act shall not be deemed as a contractual agreement, therefore, the person 
who applied this notice cannot exonerate himself from liability or cannot reduce it. 
The exculpatory unilateral act has no effect, but this notice makes the other party aware of 
the high risk of the activity and creates a link between the duty of information and the 
assumption of risk. On the other hand, as  was mentioned before, the consent of the 
contracting party to bear the risk should be articulated in an express form. Moreover, the 
Romanian Civil Code made a further clarification: “The express acceptance of the risk of 
damage cannot by itself constitute a waiver of the victim's right to obtain compensation.”20 
As we mentioned before the exculpatory clause concerns all type of remedies of non-
performance. Its purpose could be to exclude certain claims (e.g. claim for repair or 
replacement on the ground of warranty for material defects), to limit the extent of claim for 
damages or to create an absolute stipulated sum of liquidated damages.21 The limitation of 
liability may concern certain types of damage (e.g. “no responsibility for discoloration or 
damage to abandoned buttons due to dry cleaning”). Other terms have also an implied effect 
to limit liability e.g. by making enforcement of claims difficult or impossible, by imposing 
additional conditions for claim enforcement, by reversing the burden of proof, by shortening 
the period of prescription or by adding a time limit to enforcing remedies (i.e. right to 
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terminate the contract).22 In exceptional cases, the limitative clause has an effect upon third 
parties (e.g. excluding the right of the surety for defence of unexhausted remedies23). 
The term of the contract is not only applied just to exclude or limit the liability, but to 
increase it. If a concluded clause imposes extra obligations on the party while leaving 
untouched the liability of the other party for breach of contract, this clause has no limitative 
nature, so that it is not to be assessed by the invalidity rule.24 
In the light of the current Hungarian judicial practice, the question also emerges whether 
there is a so-called fundamental breach of contract for which the liability could not excluded 
or limited. Attila Menyhárd pointed out that the exculpatory clauses relating to fundamental 
breach of contract deprive the contractual obligation from its inherent substance, thus, this 
kind  of clauses has no effect both in the field of common law and both in German law (i.e. 
Kardinalpflichten).25 In Hungarian judicial practice, a decision serves as an example stating 
that the liability for impossibility of performance may not be excluded by a contractual term, 
even if its reason cannot be attributed to either of the parties.26  
Albeit, it is not worth wording this rule among the invalidity rules relating to contract 
terms in the Civil Code, the principle of good faith gains here a special purpose to protect the 
binding force of the contractual obligation. According to László Leszkoven these exculpatory 
clauses should be regarded as being not written (have no effect), since they violate the general 
principle, even if they are not expressly invalid.27 The French judicial practice had arrived at 
the similar conclusion relating to exculpatory clauses contrary to obligations undertaken.28 
These issues show the significance of the provision of DCFR which deals with the 
exculpatory contract terms against good faith and fair dealing despite  the act that in most 
cases (not in all cases however) these terms are also subject to the invalidity of unfair standard 
terms.29 
Attila Menyhárd30 and Ádám Fuglinszky31 pointed out that in practice, instead of expressly 
limitative clauses, the contracting parties conclude such contractual terms which define what 
performance is complied with the contractual obligations, and which defects in the service of 
performance are not considered as a breach of contract. For example, the parties decided that 
the hairline fractures on the attic wall due to thermal expansion was  an error which could not 
be considered as a breach of contract.32 
The so-called definitive clause determines in detail what  the parties’ duties and rights are, 
and what is considered as non-performance. The exculpatory clause exempts the party from 
remedies of non-performance. Therefore, it is hard to differentiate between them, since the 
purpose is common: to limit the obligational duties of the contracting party. It is not the 
liability but the legal duty that will be in focus, thus the liability of the contracting party will 
be eliminated at an antecedent logical step,33 and liability cannot stem from breach of no legal 
duty. 
                                                 
22 The exercise of the right to terminate the contract as remedy was time-barred of 60 days. See Decision 
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According to Menyhárd the distinction can be made only on a formal level.34 In his 
opinion, merely classifying definitive terms as exculpatory clauses per se and applying this 
invalidity rule to them is a method which raises concern, because the invalidity rule might 
cover such cases where the restriction of freedom of contract is unnecessary. He pointed out 
that the judicature of Switzerland provides additional protection against these definitive 
clauses with the help of the principle of good faith and fair dealing, or other grounds of nullity 
(e.g. concluding terms to circumvent the law).35 
Is it either really necessary or advisable to differentiate between definitive clauses and 
exculpatory clauses? Menyhárd identified the problem that the formal distinction might lead 
to the circumvention of the provisions which constitute limits against contract terms 
excluding or limiting liability for a breach of contract.36 
In our opinion, the invalidity rule of Section 6:152 of HCC should be quite broadly 
interpreted in the judicial practice to cover the so-called definitive clauses in order to protect 
the balance of contract, provided that the contracting party actually wanted to avert the 
application of this invalidity rule. This approach appears in the French Reform Bill on Civil 
Liability of 2017: “Contract terms whose object or effect is to exclude or to limit liability are 
in principle valid, in contractual as well as in extra-contractual matters. However, in the case 
of personal injury, liability cannot be limited or excluded by contract.”37 
 
 
4. Meaning of an intentional breach of contract in light of limitative clauses 
 
Parallelly with the invalidity of contractual terms limiting or excluding liability for an 
intentional breach of contract, the damage to be paid is not limited to that which is foreseeable  
provided that the breach of contract causing that damage was intentional.38  
The next question is whether the intentionality of the conduct (intentional breach of 
contract) as factual elements of the statutes in 6:143 Subsection 3 and in Section 6:152 are the 
same. 
In the frame of the amount of damage, the intentional breach of a contract means that the 
obligor was fully aware of the consequences of their conduct and acted willingly, 
premeditated or, acquiesced to the consequences of his conduct. The blameworthiness of his 
conduct (in the meaning of the generally expected standard of conduct, or fault in objective 
meaning) is not a condition, because they did not have the possibility to avoid the non-
performance, and so it was a reasonable business decision. It is not a required condition that 
they intended to cause damage to the other party.39 The meaning of the intentionality of non-
performance in the light of the contractual liability rules of the new Civil Code is discussed by 
recent Hungarian legal literature. László Leszkoven considers that the meaning of 
intentionality is closer to the premeditation (dolus directus) than to conditional intent (dolus 
                                                 
34 Menyhárd, Attila: Fogyasztóvédelem és felelősségkorlátozás. Gazdaság és Jog, 2001/12, 22. 
35 Menyhárd (2000): op. cit.,129. 
36 Menyhárd (2001): op. cit., 22. 
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38 HCC Section 6:143 Subsection 2 and 3 „Other damage to the assets of the obligee and the loss of profit that 
occurred as a consequence of the breach of contract shall be compensated for to the extent the obligee proves 
that the damage, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract, was foreseeable at the time of concluding 
the contract. In the event of intentional breach of contract, the entire amount of damage arising on the part of 
the obligee shall be compensated for.” 
39 Vékás: op. cit., 234. 
  
eventualis).40 Ádám Fuglinszky examines in detail the adaptability of the criminal concepts of 
intent (dolus) and the accountability of human intentional conduct to legal persons. He thinks 
that the shades of meaning will be elaborated by the interpretation of future legal practice.41 
Attila Menyhárd also mentioned that the interpretation of this subjective mental element 
should be very abstract.42 
In the scope of limitation of liability, however, the broadened concept of intentionality 
seems to be more equitable, in light of the fact that not only the intentional but also grossly 
negligent breach of contract were subject to the former rule of invalidity in Civil Code of 
1959 in the case of which the limitation or exclusion of liability by term of contract was 
prohibited. Moreover, it should be also taken into consideration that most European countries 
extended the scope of invalidity to the terms limiting or excluding liability not only for intent 
but also for gross negligence, as did the DCFR as well.43 The reason why the former rule had 
to be amended in that regard is the difficulty of distinguishing between gross and simple 
negligence in practice.44 
 
 
5. Concluding limitative clause or waiving a right 
 
The limitative terms need to be concluded, that is, should be the part of the contractual 
agreement. From the viewpoint of the party applying an exculpatory clause, it needs the other 
party’s consent. With his consent, the liability was limited (or excluded), thus, he waived 
some of his rights stemming from non-performance. In our opinion, there is a close 
connection between a unilateral waiver and a limitative term of a contract. Moreover, an a 
priori waiver of a right on the part of the potentially aggrieved party to claim damages could 
also be interpreted as an express consent to suffer damage, or an assumption of risk.45 In this 
latter case, the express consent justifies the harmful act and exonerates the tortfeasor (the 
party of the contract) from the liability, and leads to no breach of contract having taken place 
at all. Although the term of a contract limiting or excluding liability for harming life or bodily 
integrity is invalid, however, the consent of the party has valid effect and eliminates  
wrongfulness.46 
It should be mentioned here that these interpretations and the exculpatory clauses relating 
to harming life or bodily integrity should be limited to a narrow field of special cases in order 
to protect these values. For example, in the judicature of the USA these exculpatory clauses 
are only invalid in the contracts for extreme sports, e.g. parachuting.47 
Examining further the party’s waiving, according to Section 6:8 Subsection 3 of HCC a 
waiver or release of a right shall be made by way of an express juridical act. If someone 
waives or releases a right, his juridical act shall not be interpreted broadly. 
                                                 
40 Leszkoven: op. cit., 161. 
41 Fuglinszky, Ádám: Az előreláthatósági klauzula értelmezésének újabb dilemmái. Gazdaság és Jog, 2019/7–8, 
1–7. 
42 Menyhárd, Attila: Az új Ptk. szerződési rendszere. Presentation held on 13 November 2019 at the Conference 
of Magyar Jogász Egylet on the Anniversary of the HCC. 
43 See Notes attached to Article III.–3:105 in DCFR Commentary, 821–826. 
44 It was pointed out by Eörsi. See Eörsi (1975): op. cit. 
45 Pusztahelyi, Réka: Assumption of Risk and Express Consent from the Viewpoint of Liability for Highly 
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Ádám Fuglinszky added that the rules of invalidity and ineffectiveness related to the 
juridical acts are to be applied as well. 48 In relation to consent, Fuglinszky reminds us of the 
cautious application of the provisions concerning exculpatory clauses:49 these rules could be 
applied analogously at most, since the two legal instruments (exculpatory clause and consent) 
do not serve the same purpose.50 
According to Tamás Fézer the consent and the exculpatory clauses are closely related 
concepts, and he dealt with their unified application but under certain conditions.51 Another 
author, György Wellmann wrote the following: “In our opinion, comparing  subsections 1 
and 2 of section 342 the interpretation leads us to the only correct solution which is that the 
agreement is invalid in which the injurer excluded his liability for damages from injury and in 
which the injured person had given consent to be injured in his bodily integrity and to bear 
the consequences – provided that the agreement neither infringes nor endangers social 
interest or public policy.”52 
Gyula Eörsi also analysed this issue: it is not unlawful to cause damage with the consent 
of the injured party within limits. He referred to invalidity of exculpatory clauses, and added 
that such a juridical act in the contract was not meant to be interpreted in each case as an 
express consent, but it has a similar effect in the viewpoint of the law, since it grants 
exoneration from liability by a legal statement.53 
Reviewing the Hungarian theoretical opinions, our conclusion is that the antecedent legal 
opinions sought the solution of the collision of the provisions in the bilateral nature of the 
agreements including the voluntary acquiescence of the injured person. The recent legal 
opinion stressed the differences between the express consent and the assumption of risk to 
resolve the discrepancy and answer the practical questions.  
As the exonerative effect of express consent does not require anymore that the consent 
should neither infringe nor endanger social interest or public policy, it seems that an onerous 
condition was removed out of the way of the free interpretation. Therefore, the importance of 
the invalidity of the prohibited exculpatory clauses will increase on the other side of the scale. 
The waiver or release of a right to claim remedies of breach of contract should be assessed 
separately from the juridical acts in which the contracting party waives the right of contesting 
on the ground of invalidity54 or waives the right to request the legal consequences of 
invalidity.55 
The contracting party could waive their right to claim damages either before (a priori 
waiver, waiver in advance) or after suffering damage (a posteriori waiver, waiver afterward). 
In many cases, the careful examination of the express nature of the waiver reveals the issue 
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whether the party was fully aware of the consequences of their legal statement. The a priori 
waiver – as a rule – is deemed as valid, the private autonomy does not suffer such a limitation. 
As stated by Dezső Nagy, even rights of content or of extent yet unknown could be waived, 
provided that, the right should be individualised and identified so that it is undoubtful what it 
constitutes.56 According to some decision from the Hungarian judicial practice, the claim 
should already exist when the waiver has occurred otherwise its content will not be 
unequivocal.57 At this point, assessing the express nature of an a priori or a posteriori waiver, 
we can sense the working of the phenomena that Salamon Beck showed: the binding nature is 
attached differently to the rules concerning different life stages of the contractual obligation 
(so-called “létszaki kógensség”).58 
In consumer contracts the validity of waivers made by the consumer is limited further. 
Most of all waivers, whether made by a consumer in advance or afterwards, are invalid. This 
is the case as the consumer may not validly waive any special rights granted to the consumer 
in the special rules governing the terms of the consumer contract.59 
Another interesting issue should also be mentioned which helps us to understand the 
interaction between consent, assumption of risk and limitative clause or notice. One element 
can be found in the new Romanian Civil Code, in Section 1355. The Subsection 4 stipulates 
that the express acceptance of the risk of damage cannot by itself constitute a waiver of the 
victim's right to obtain compensation. That means not all express acceptances of risk are 
considered to be a waiver of rights. 
On the other hand, as to the connection between limitative clauses and the consent to 
damage, Section 65 Subsection 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 of the United Kingdom 
gives further clues: “Where a term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice, purports to 
exclude or restrict a trader's liability for negligence, a person is not to be taken to have 
voluntarily accepted any risk merely because the person agreed to or knew about the term or 
notice.” It means that the burden of proof is laid on the trader in order to prove that the 
conclusion of the limitative or exonerative contract term (or tacit acquiescence of a notice) is 
interpreted as an acceptance of the risk. 
In conclusion, in light of the legal effect, the exculpatory clauses are closely connected to 
the consent of the contracting party to be potentially injured. In this context, a limitative term 
may be interpreted as a juridical act of that party waiving his rights in advance. Concluding an 
exonerative or limitative term means that the party releases the right to claim remedies. 
Taking into consideration this conceptual connection, the requirement of an express waiver 
seems to be applied to the limitative terms of contract, as well. Therefore, being applied time 
to time the same limitative term among the standard terms and conditions may become 
custom or practice, nevertheless, it will become part of the content of the contract provided 
only that the contracting parties have agreed to it expressly.60 
In consumer contracts, with the rights granted by special rules for consumers, and only in 
the scope of those rights, waivers are invalid regardless of the content of the given juridical 
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act. The invalidity of a waiver may also have an effect upon the validity of limitative terms. 
Despite  the close connection between limitative terms of contracts and acceptance of risk, the 
thought is acceptable according to which the trader (business) has to prove the fact that the 
consumer  accepted not only the term of contract but expressly the risk of damage. 
 
 
6. Limitative contract terms which are excessively general  
 
General and vague contract terms are common in practice, especially in the field of 
consumers contracts. These terms are worded in a very simply way, with the contracting party 
exonerating themselves of all risks and liability. For example: “By purchasing a ticket, the 
visitor irrevocably accepts these terms and conditions of the go-kart track. Liability for 
damages is excluded.” Or: “The use of facilities, free or rentable sport equipment in the camp 
of XY is at the sole risk of the guests, and the owner excludes any liability for damages.” 
These general exonerative terms are invalid, because they exclude liability for damage not 
only to property but also to personal rights (life, bodily integrity). According to another 
interpretation, these clauses should be assessed retrospectively, in  light of the suffered harm, 
whether the liability for the damage occurred is limited or not.61 However, the other approach, 
the consent given by the injured person, should be taken into consideration again, and these 
clauses are missing the expressed nature of the consent to suffer damage.  
In the judicial practice, with the help of the appropriate interpretation of a limitative term 
worded vaguely, the court is able to avoid the formal nullity. The reasoning of the following 
decision seems to be analogously applicable, in which the lawsuit of the plaintiff was based 
on the nullity of unfair contract terms. The court stated that the general terms and conditions 
(including limitative terms) concerning bank accounts are also subjected to the relevant legal 
provisions which should be taken into account while interpreting the limitative clauses. The 
bank was not intended to infringe statutory provisions with this exculpatory clause at issue.62 
However, in the case of contesting B2C contracts, this reasoning is contrary to the special rule 
of interpretation.63 
 
 
7. Exculpatory clauses in light of unfair standard contract terms 
 
Eörsi has already listed other legal instruments as filters against contract terms limiting or 
excluding liability such as special requirements to apply standard contract terms and 
conditions, i.e. provisions relating to unfair standard contract terms or other errors in the 
intended legal effect, or, the principle of in dubio contra proferentem.64 For the purpose of 
consumer protection and to counterpoise the imbalances between contracting parties, 
numerous rules of nullity can be identified which are connected to the general invalidity rule 
of limitative clauses such as contract terms infringing consumer rights (6:100), the 
consumer’s statement of waiver (6:101) or unfair standard contract terms (6:102–6:106). 
Incomprehensible or conflicting clauses are also null and void (6:107). 
In the opinion of Péter Takáts, the standard terms and conditions can be classified in two 
categories. In the first group, there are technical and economic conditions. The other group of 
terms reflect the business and legal interests of the party; therefore, this includes in particular 
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the exculpatory clauses.65 Standardization or automation through the use of general contract 
terms can effectively serve the management of risks in mass transactions. Therefore, the 
application of limitative terms as a part of the general terms and conditions is very common. 
Contrary to the general invalidity rule of 6:152, the invalidity rule of unfair general 
contract terms sets limits against contractual terms in different way. The main purpose is to 
protect the balance of the contractual rights and duties between the parties and to protect the 
contractual relationship against distortions stemming from the imbalance of bargaining 
powers of the contracting parties. Under Section 6:102 of HCC, a standard contract term shall 
be unfair if it unilaterally and unreasonably, and by violating the principle of good faith and 
fair dealing, sets forth the rights and obligations arising from a contract to the detriment of the 
party contracting with the person applying that contractual term. 
The protection of consumers (who are generally the weaker party) is another purpose 
which should be fulfilled, but at some points, the scopes of protection overlap each other. In 
the field of consumer protection, Council Directive 93/13/EEC66 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts listed the terms as unfair whose object or effect is to exclude or limits the legal 
liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death of a consumer or personal injury to the 
latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or supplier. 
In the light of the above-mentioned connection between an injured person’s consent to 
damage, assumption of risk and waiver of rights, the exonerative clauses for death or personal 
injuries will be invalid or ineffective in all European countries, in consumer contracts, first of 
all, but later on generally, in all types of contracts.67 
In Hungary this special bar on limitative clauses applied in consumer contracts is missing, 
because a more general rule, i.e. Section 6:152 which grants absolute protection against 
clauses excluding or limiting liability for death or personal injuries regardless of the 
contracting parties. 
This is one of the cases where the Hungarian lawmakers had to dissolve the collisions 
between invalidity rules relating to limitative clauses regulating consumer law and the general 
law of obligation at the same time. In our opinion, in other cases when both a general bar and 
a special bar on limitative clauses are applicable, the provisions may be applied altogether. 
For example, the Curia (Hungarian Supreme Court) articulated in its decision that the 
interpretation and the application of the general invalidity in Section 314 of old HCC and the 
special provisions on travel contracts are to be interpreted and applied in light of the Directive 
on unfair contract terms of consumer contracts (especially the above-mentioned rule relating 
to death and personal injuries).68 
Other cases of unfairness also refer to the bar on limitative and exonerative clauses such 
as terms that exclude or restrict the undertaking’s liability for the vicarious agent used by it;69 
terms that exclude or restrict the consumer’s options to enforce his claims at court or through 
other legal ways, in particular if it exclusively forces the consumer to the arbitral route 
without any requirement set forth by law, or unlawfully restricts the possibilities for taking 
evidence or imposes a burden of proof that should be borne by the other party under the 
applicable legal provisions;70 or terms that exclude or restrict the consumer’s rights provided 
by the law in the event of the undertaking’s breach of contract.71  
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We agree with Attila Menyhárd that the control of limitative and exonerative clauses and 
the control of unfair general contract terms are laid on different planes of thinking. In our 
opinion, the main characteristic feature of the invalidity rule of unfair terms is the subjective 
element: the unfairness. The rule of Section 6:152 is not based on such a subjective condition. 
As we mentioned above it is an objective and minimum limit against contractual freedom. 
The parallel regulation was maintained through the UK’s recent legislation. The above-
mentioned Consumer Rights Act of 2015 only amended the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 
1977 (UCTA). This is despite the fact that the new act intended to streamline the legislation 
governing unfair terms in relation to consumer contracts, which was found in two separate 
pieces of legislation [UCTA and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (UTCCR) 
of 1999] removing anomalies and overlapping provisions.72 
 
 
8. Final remarks  
 
Among the rules setting up controls of contractual terms limiting or excluding liability, 
the invalidity rule in section 6:152 of HCC constitutes the most general bar. As mentioned 
above, it is an objective cap of the freedom of contract, an unconditional (absolute) and 
minimum protection to which all exculpatory clauses are subject. Compared to other grounds 
of invalidity, it constitutes a bar being without a subjective element, that is to say, irrespective 
of the nature of the particular contract type, the quality of the contracting parties, or other 
terms of the contract. On the one hand, the new Hungarian Civil Code restricted its scope of 
application to the narrowest possible field to protect the principle of freedom of contract. On 
the other hand, based on the general nature of the prohibition, it maintained this rule despite  
the fact that it has a wide application scope similarly to the invalidity rules relating to unfair 
standard terms. 
In this essay, the interactions between limitative clauses and the consent to damage, the 
assumption of risk, and the waiver of a right were also examined, since in the judicial practice 
the consent of an injured person (rarely) has legal effect and exempts the tortfeasor from 
liability, although the invalidity of terms excluding liability for personal injuries is 
undoubtedly invalid. The influence of consumer protection suggests that this narrow 
exception should be outlined better. Neither the general prohibition of, nor the total freedom 
of terms excluding or limiting liability for death or personal injuries is a better solution. 
However, in an extreme situation such as parachuting, it is unreasonable to protect the 
contracting party as consumer (volunti non fit iniura). 
Our conclusion is that the express nature of the consent should also be required for the 
exculpatory clauses. 
In the regime of delictual liability the invalidity rule of limitative clauses is repeated, not 
only as a general rule, but also in special, more stringent invalidity rules attached to cases of 
strict liability. The so-called “non-cumul” rule, laid down in Section 6:145 of HCC would 
threaten that this stricter bar on limitative clauses may not be applied if there is a contractual 
relationship between parties.  
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